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1 Introduction
Credence goods markets su¤er from informational asymmetries between ex-
pert sellers and customers, because customers are unable to observe the qual-
ity they need, whereas expert sellers are able to do so. Depending on infor-
mational conditions and prices for di¤erent qualities, expert sellers may have
monetary incentives to provide unnecessary high quality or insu¢ cient low
quality or to charge for a higher quality than provided. Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer (2006) show that either liability, i.e. experts being forced to provide
su¢ cient treatment by institutional rules, or veriability, i.e. customers be-
ing able to verify which quality they receive, induces experts to choose prices
such that e¢ ciency prevails on the market for credence goods.
We conducted experiments with endogenous prices and nd that veri-
ability alone is of little help. In fact, aggregate behavior in markets where
veriability holds but liability is violated is very similar to the behavior in
markets where both veriability and liability are violated. Additionally, the
overall performance in both conditions - with or without veriability - is
better than the standard prediction for a market without veriability, but
worse than the standard prediction for a market with veriability. Also, in
both types of markets some experts always provide appropriate treatment
even if own-money-maximization calls for under- (or over-) treatment. In
many cases prices are often such that the gains of trade are split equally
between expert and consumer if the former provides the appropriate quality
and charges honestly. Finally, equal mark-up prices the theoretical solution
to the problems of over- and undertreatment often lead to overtreatment.
Overall our ndings from the experiments with endogenous prices suggest
that two motives play an important role for expertsbehavior: inequality
aversion (see Fehr and Schmidt 1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) and
preferences for e¢ ciency (see Charness and Rabin 2002 and Engelmann and
Strobel 2004). The inequality aversion predicts that expertsbehavior de-
pends not only on the own monetary payo¤ but also on that of the consumer
thereby for some price vectorsjustifying appropriate treatment to reduce
inequality when money maximization calls for over- or undertreatment. For
other price vectors it calls for under- or overtreatment when own money
maximization is consistent with proving the appropriate treatment. Pref-
erences for e¢ ciency predict appropriate treatment unless the benet from
over- or undertreatment is such that it compensates for the utility cost of the
associated e¢ ciency loss.
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We explore the implications of both motives for expertsprovision behav-
ior theoretically and discriminate between them empirically using treatments
with exogenously given price vectors. We then classify experimental experts
according to their provision behavior. We nd that the behavior of a major-
ity of subjects is consistent with one of the two motivations. Specically, a
taste for e¢ ciency seems to play an important role for provision behavior for
more than 40% of the experimental subjects, while inequality aversion seems
to be a major motivation for about 30% of experts.
Credence goods markets are important markets in modern economies,
health and many repair services but also nancial consulting services and
sales services of technical equipment are examples. Empirical and anecdotal
evidence clearly documented the problems with credence goods. Wolinsky
(1993, 1995) refers to a survey conducted by the Department of Transporta-
tion estimating that more than half of car repairs are unnecessary. Hub-
bard (1998) shows that car mechanics conduct vehicle inspections di¤erently
depending on whether the vehicles are on warranty or not. In a medical
context, Emons (1997) cites a Swiss study reporting that the average per-
sons probability of receiving one of seven major surgical interventions is one
third above that of a physician or a member of a physicians family, indicat-
ing that customers(presumed) education and information level a¤ects the
quality of treatment they receive. He also mentions a study by the Federal
Trade Commission that documents the tendency of optometrists to prescribe
unnecessary treatment. Iizuka (2007) investigates the Japanese drug pre-
scription market where doctors often both prescribe and dispense drugs and
nds that their prescriptions respond to markup di¤erences. Gruber et al.
(1999) show that the relative frequency of Cesarean deliveries compared to
normal child births reacts to the fee di¤erentials of health insurance pro-
grams for both types of treatments. Hughes and Yule (1992) nd that the
number of cervical cytology treatments is positively correlated with the fee
for this treatment. Fuchs (1978) and Jürges (2007) show that a large part of
patientsdemand for health care services is supply-driven, because physician
density, for instance, has a signicant positive e¤ect on the number of doctor
visits or operations.
Though empirical studies on credence goods markets provide compelling
evidence for ine¢ ciencies, they generally su¤er from the lack of a controlled
variation of factors that inuence the e¢ cient provision of credence goods.
Either these papers provide evidence that overtreatment is happening, with-
out systematically exploring the conditions leading to it (see, e.g., the case
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studies mentioned in Wolinsky 1993 and 1995, or Emons 1997). Or they vary
only one particular aspect that inuences the provision of credence goods 
for example the price di¤erential between Cesarean section deliveries and
normal child births (Gruber et al. 1999) without controlling for and vary-
ing other important factors. Experiments allow for a much broader variation
of important factors under ceteris paribus conditions. The main focus of
the present paper is on the e¤ect of the presence or absence of a specic
condition, the veriability of the provided treatment quality.
Veriability of the provided treatment quality is likely to hold in im-
portant credence goods markets, including dental services, automobile and
equipment repair and pest control. For more sophisticated repairs, where the
customer is usually not physically present during the treatment, veriabil-
ity is often secured indirectly through the provision of ex post evidence. In
the automobile repair market, for instance, it is quite common that broken
parts are handed over to the customer to substantiate the claim that replace-
ment, and not only repair, has been performed. Similarly, in the historic car
restoration market the type of treatment is usually documented step by step
in pictures.
There exists some theoretical literature assuming veriability (see Dul-
leck and Kerschbamer 2006 for a survey). Emons (1987 and 1993) studies
the incentives of experts to under- or overtreat consumers and nds that
whether the market mechanism induces non-fraudulent behavior depends on
the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the expertsin-
centives to be honest. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) study competition
between experts and discounters and show that under some conditions ex-
perts will not survive competition by discounters. Alger and Salanié (2006)
study a homogeneous consumer model in which the degree of veriability
is a continuous variable. They identify an equilibrium in which experts de-
fraud consumers in order to keep them uninformed, as this deters them from
seeking a better price elsewhere.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
our experimental design with endogenous prices and presents the main ev-
idence we nd. In Section 3 we introduce the two competing models, one
based on preferences for e¢ ciency and one based on inequality aversion. This
section results in predictions that are then used in the Section 4 to empiri-
cal discriminate between the explanations using treatments with exogenous
prices. In this section we also classify experts according to their provision
behavior. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Credence Goods: Standard Theory and Ex-
perimental Evidence - The Role of Veria-
bility
We start this section with a description of the implemented game and stan-
dard theorys predictions.
2.1 Basic Model and Standard Predictions
Customers (he) are ex ante identical and know that they need a major treat-
ment (th) with probability h, and a minor treatment (tl) with probability
1 h. Each customer (he) is randomly matched with one seller (she) who sets
prices ph and pl for the major, respectively minor, treatment (with ph  pl).
The seller has costs ch for the major treatment, and cl for the minor one
(with ch > cl).
The customer only knows the prices for the di¤erent treatments, but not
the type of treatment that he needs, when he makes his decision whether
or not to interact with the seller. In case of interaction, the seller gets to
know which type of treatment the customer needs. Then she provides one
of the two treatments and charges one of the two prices. Customers in need
of the minor treatment tl are su¢ ciently treated in any case (both if the
seller chooses tl and if she chooses th). However, if the customer needs the
major treatment th, then only th is su¢ cient. A su¢ cient treatment yields
a value v > 0 for the customer, an insu¢ cient treatment yields a value of
zero. If the customer decides against interaction then both the customer and
the seller receive an outside option of o  0. In case of an interaction, the
monetary payo¤ for the consumer is the value from being treated minus the
price to be paid, whereas the seller receives as a monetary payo¤ the price
charged minus the costs of the provided treatment (cl if tl has been provided,
otherwise ch). Figure 1 presents this game.
Standard theory predicts that experts, once the customer chooses to in-
teract, always deliver low quality and charge for high quality. This implies
a market break down if hv   cl < 2o because consumers will choose not to
interact unless the seller sets the high price below hv  o. Furthermore, even
if hv   cl > 2o customers are predicted to be consistently overcharged and
more importantly undertreated.
One solution to the dilemma is to introduce veriability. Veriability
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Figure 1: The Credence Goods Game
means that consumers are able to observe and verify ex post the treatment
that has been provided by the seller (without knowing, however, whether this
treatment is the appropriate one). As a consequence, veriability prevents
overcharging but it does not preclude under- and/or overtreatment.
How does the presence of veriability change the standard theorys pre-
diction? With veriability the expert can choose equal mark-up prices that
keep her indi¤erent between providing di¤erent treatments. Either by as-
sumption, i.e. that if indi¤erent the expert will provide in the best interest
of the customer, or by referring to the limit of a mixed strategy equilibrium,
one can show that such prices will indeed be chosen in equilibrium by ex-
perts with standard preferences, leading to e¢ cient provision behavior. For
the two quality case, Figure 2 shows in the space of price vectors (ph; pl)
the set of vectors that induce e¢ cient service. Below this line the expert is
induced to always provide low quality (undertreatment in case the consumer
needs th) and above the line the expert is induced to always provide high
quality (overtreatment in case the consumer needs tl). The line has a slope
of one and intersects the vertical axis at ch   cl connecting all points where
ph   ch = pl   cl:
5
ph
ch-cl
overtreatment
undertreatment
pl
ph=pl+( ch-cl)
Figure 2: Price vectors that induce e¢ cient provision of credence goods under
the assumption of standard preferences.
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2.2 Experimental Design
To understand the role of veriabilty, we compare two experimental condi-
tions.1 In one we impose no veriability - condition N - and in the other we
impose veriability - condition V. In these conditions, we follow the standard
credence goods game as depicted in Figure 1 with the exception that the last
stage is degenerate in condition V. In condition V the expert has to charge
the price posted for the provided treatment. In section 4 of this article we
investigate an additional condition - condition VFix - where veriability ap-
plies and prices are exogenously set, i.e. experts and customers decide under
exogenously given prices.
In all experimental conditions we let the customers probability of needing
the major treatment be h = 0:5, and the value of a su¢ cient treatment be
v = 10. The costs of providing the minor, respectively major, treatment are
cl = 2, and ch = 6. The prices posted by the sellers, pl and ph (with pl  ph),
have to be chosen in integer numbers from the interval {1, 11}. The outside
option if no trade takes place between the seller and the customer is set to
o = 1:6.
We always use matching groups of eight subjects each, which is common
knowledge in all conditions. Four subjects in each matching group are in the
role of customers, and four in the role of sellers. The assignment to roles is
randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment, and roles are kept
xed throughout the entire experiment.
There are 16 periods of interaction between sellers and consumers in both
conditions. Due to the repetition of the stage game, the matching of subjects
is important. Since our main focus is on the role of veriability on the one
hand, and the impact of non-standard preferences on the provision behavior
of experts on the other hand, we do not want to give sellers an opportunity
to build up a reputation in the course of the repeated interaction. Therefore,
we use a stranger matching in which customers and sellers are randomly
rematched after each period.
All experimental sessions were run computerized (using zTree; Fischbacher,
2007) and recruiting was done via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). A total of 248
subjects participated in the experiment, most of them studying economics,
business administration, and social and life sciences. All sessions started with
an extensive description of the game. All parameters as well as the match-
1Since in our story sellers proved a "treatment" to consumers we will refer to experi-
mental treatments as conditions throughout the article.
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ing procedure were made common knowledge to all participants by reading
them aloud. Before the experiment started, participants had to answer a set
of control questions correctly to ensure that they had fully understood the
instructions. For every session we invited four subjects more than needed in
order make sure that we get enough subjects who could answer all questions
correctly. Once a number of subjects required to start a session had answered
all questions correctly, the four remaining subjects were paid 4 Euro and dis-
missed. The average session length was 1.5 hours, and subjects earned on
average 15 Euro.
2.3 Standard Theory and the Role of Veriability
We can solve the game by backward induction. Without veriablity, the
expert will always charge the higher price ph and always provide the cheaper
treatment cl. Anticipating this consumers will only accept if ph  hv   o =
3:4. But with such a price the expert earns less than the outside option
(ph   cl < o). Thus, without veriability the market breaks down. With
veriability the expert cannot charge for a treatment other than the provided
one and the provided treatment depends on the mark-up pi   ci; i 2 fl; hg.
To characterize the provision behavior of experts it is useful to distinguish
the following three types of price vectors:
 an equal mark-up price-vector is dened as one that satises ph   pl =
ch   cl = 4.
 an undertreatment price-vector satises ph   pl < ch   cl = 4.
 an overtreatment price-vector is characterized by ph  pl > ch  cl = 4.
Under equal mark-up price vectors sellers provide the appropriate treat-
ment, while they provide always the minor (major) treatment under the
undertreatment (overtreatment) price vectors. Anticipating this, consumers
will accept an equal mark-up vector i¤ ph  10, an undertreatment vector i¤
pl  3, and an overtreatment vector i¤ ph  8. Thus, to maximize prots,
experts will choose ph = 10 and pl = 6 which will be accepted by a risk
neutral consumer. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Prediction 1 Assume that subjects have standard preferences. Then
in condition N no interaction will take place on the experimental credence
goods market while in condition V all interactions will be carried out and full
e¢ ciency prevails.
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2.4 Aggregate Behavior
Observation 1 (Aggregate Behavior) Veriability has no signicant im-
pact on the frequency of interaction and the degree of e¢ ciency on the ex-
perimental credence goods market. Indeed, the frequency of interaction, the
undertreatment rate, the overtreatment rate and overall e¢ ciency are not sig-
nicantly di¤erent in conditions V and N. The overall performance in both
conditions is better than the standard prediction for condition N, but worse
than the standard prediction for condition V.
Table 1 below presents some aggregate data. Veriability does, in no way,
help to solve the credence goods problem. Interaction, e¢ ciency, under- and
overtreatment rates are not signicantly di¤erent in condition V compared
to condition N. Thus, Prediction 1 can clearly be rejected.
Table 1: Summary statistics for conditions N and V.
Averages per period Condition N Condition V
Interactiona 0.45 0.50
E¢ ciencyb 0.18 0.16
Undertreatmentc 0.53 0.60
Overtreatmentd 0.06 0.05
Overcharginge 0.86 -
pl with Interaction 4.67 5.84
pl without Interaction 5.17 6.21
ph with Interaction 7.28 7.70
ph without Interaction 7.91 7.82
Actually charged price 7.08 6.44
Prots Sellersf 2.69 2.58
Prots Customersf 1.00 1.06
bold numbers are signicantly di¤erent 5% Mann-Whitney U -tests for pairw ise
d i¤erences b etween treatm ents (w ith match ing groups of 8 sub jects as one indep endent observation)
a relative frequency,
b
calcu lated as (actual average prot  outside option) / (maximum possib le average prot  outside option),
c customer needs th, but seller provides tl;d customer needs tl, but seller provides th,
e seller provides tl, but charges th (with ph > pland customer needs tl),
f in experimental currency units.
Before proceeding it is worthwhile to note that standard theory provides
not only the equilibrium predictions of no interaction at all in condition N,
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it also predicts that if interaction takes place in N, the undertreatment rate
should be (close to) one! This is obviously not what we observe: The under-
treatment is with 53% high, but far from the predicted 100%. Additionally,
it is surely not signicantly higher in N than in V.
What went wrong in condition V? According to the theoretical prediction
sellers should choose equal mark-up prices. However, such prices are very rare
in condition V - they are chosen in less than 5% of all transactions. Similarly
rare are overtreatment price vectors, i.e. price vectors that provide incentives
to overtreat the customer since ph   ch > pl   cl. Most posted price vectors
are from the undertreatment variety, ie. pl   cl > ph   ch. Table 2 below
reports the frequencies of the ve most popular price vectors in conditions N
and V.
Table 2: The ve most popular price vectors posted in condi-
tions N and V.
Condition N Condition V
(pl; ph) absolute # frequency (pl; ph) absolute # frequency
(6,8) 176 22.92% (6,8) 265 37.64%
(4,8) 84 10.94% (7,8) 89 12.64%
(5,7) 50 6.51% (5,8) 46 6.53%
(5,8) 44 5.73% (4,8) 17 2.41%
(4,7) 39 5.08% (8,8) 15 2.13%
393 (of 768) 51.17% 432 (of 704) 61.36%
Notice, in both conditions the price vector (6,8) is by far the most frequent
price vector. This price vector splits the gains from trade equally between
consumers and sellers - if sellers always provide the appropriate treatment
and charge for the provided treatment. The prominence of this price vector
suggests that a concern for relative payo¤s plays a role for aggregate behavior
in the experiment.
There is other evidence that points in the same direction and that also
helps to explain the poor performance in condition V: In those rare cases
where equal mark-up vectors have been chosen they frequently lead to overtreat-
ment - overall the overtreatment rate under equal mark-up prices is about
1/3! Table 3 contains the ve most frequently posted price vectors and shows
how the aggregate under- and overtreatment rates change in the price di¤er-
ence ph   pl:
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Table 3: Under- and overtreatment rates in condition V
(pl; ph) Overtreatment rate Undertreatment rate
(4,8) 37.5% 0%
(5,8) 14.3% 33%
(6,8) 1.25% 53%
(7,8) 0% 65%
(8,8) 0% 100%
The next subsection looks at the individual behavior.
2.5 Individual Behavior
Turning to individual behavior it is interesting to note that in both condi-
tions there exist two types of players that exhibit the same provision policy
throughout the game. Lets rst look at condition N. Standard theory pre-
dicts that all sellers consistently provide cl independently of the price vector
under which they operate and independently of the type of treatment the
customer needs. Looking at the data we observe that 14 of the 48 sellers,
that is 29% of all sellers, behave exactly in this manner. The number of sell-
ers displaying this behavior increases to 25 (50%) if we only look at the nal
10 periods of the experiment. More surprising is, that 12 of the 48 sellers
(25%) always choose to provide the appropriate treatment.
The picture in condition V is similar: One group of sellers, consisting
of 17 of the 44 sellers, or 39% of sellers in this experiment, consistently
posts undertreatment price vectors and always provides cl independent of
the customers needed treatment. Again, this number increases to almost
50% if we concentrate on the last 10 periods. The second group of experts -
consisting of 7 experts (or 16%) always provides the appropriate treatment
even though most the time those experts posted undertreatment vectors, too.
Table 4: Number and frequency of subjects with consistent be-
havior over all 16 periods (in brackets values for the last ten rounds)
Condition N Condition V
Behavior # of Subjects Frequency # of Subjects Frequency
Own prot maximizing 14 (25) 29(52)% 17 (21) 39(48)%
appropriate treatment 12 25% 7 16%
provision
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In both conditions it is interesting to note that those experts posting a
(6,8) price vector are more likely to provide the appropriate treatment: In
condition N, more than 50% of the (6,8) price vectors are posted by experts
always providing the appropriate treatment while they make up only 25% of
the population. In condition V more than 20% of the (6,8) price vectors are
posted by experts always providing the appropriate treatment, while they
make up only 15% of the population.
Observation 2 (Individual Behavior) In both conditions, N and V,
there exist two types of players that exhibit the same behavior throughout
the 16 periods of the game. The rst group consists of underproviders. In
condition N its members always provide low quality and always charge for
high quality. In condition V this group consists of 40% of the subjects and
its members always choose undertreatment price vectors and always provide
low quality. The second group consists of appropriate providers. Members of
this group always provide the appropriate quality in both conditions. Members
of this group have a tendency to choose the price vector (6; 8).
3 Non-Standard Preferences
The results of our experimental investigation suggest that the behavior of a
subset of subjects is not only motivated by their own monetary payo¤. On
the one hand the prominence of price vector (6,8) suggests that inequality
aversion is relevant for behavior, on the other hand, the result on undertreat-
ment behavior is consistent with the hypothesis that at least some subjects
have a taste for e¢ ciency. In this section we explore the implications of
such motives of experts for their provision behavior. To keep the exposition
simple, our main focus will be on condition V.
3.1 Preferences for E¢ ciency
Suppose that (some) sellers derive an extra utility from providing the appro-
priate treatment or that they feel a moral cost if they under- or overtreat a
customer. A preference for e¢ ciency has been postulated, for example, in
Charness and Rabins (2002) inuential paper on social preferences, where
they assume that a subjects utility does not only depend on its own payo¤,
but also on the minimum of payo¤s in a peer group and the sum of payo¤s
in this group. The latter argument in a subjects utility function represents
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a desire for e¢ ciency. Engelmann and Strobel (2004) report that Charness
and Rabins (2002) model is very suitable for describing behavior in simple
distributional games. A desire for e¢ ciency will render undertreatment and
overtreatment less attractive, as both actions bear a cost for the seller.
We formulate the taste for e¢ ciency of sellers as follows: Let  2 fl; hg
be the index of a customers type of problem and  2 fl; hg the index of the
treatment provided. Then the utility of a seller of type (; ) is assumed to
be given by
U;(p
l; ph; ; ) = p   c   I>   I<: (1)
where   0 is the disutility from undertreating and   0 is the disutility
from overtreating. I denotes an indicator variable which takes the value of
one if the condition in the subscript is met and the value of zero otherwise.2
Following the literature we assume that buyers and sellers are heterogeneous
with respect to their inequality aversion, ie. an agents type is characterized
by values of  and . Types are independently drawn from the same cumula-
tive distribution F (; ) with strictly positive density on [0; max] [0; max).
Given that we are only interested in sellersprovision behavior, it is only im-
portant that ;  are seller specic and do not change in short periods of
time.
This utility function has straightforward behavioral implications. First,
consider condition N. If ch cl; i.e. the additional prot a seller receives when
referring to undertreatment, is small compared to the experts disutility 
from undertreating a customer then the expert will use a policy to provide
the appropriate treatment. Overtreatment is never optimal for an expert
in N. Next consider condition V. The mark-up di¤erence, i.e. (ph   ch)  
(pl   cl); becomes important. Figure 3 shows the areas of undertreatment
and overtreatment when veriability applies. Note, that without veriability
either a seller always undertreats or always chooses the appropriate treatment
under each price vector. When veriability holds, the expert chooses either
the appropriate treatment or always provides the treatment with the higher
mark-up, depending on the prices posted. Important for our analysis is that
a taste for e¢ ciency predicts appropriate treatment in a corridor along the
equal mark-up line.
2We use the convention that l  h, but not vice versa.
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Figure 3: Price vectors that induce e¢ cient provision of credence goods under
the assumption of e¢ ciency loving preferences.
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3.2 Inequality Averse Preferences
Suppose that (some) sellers derive a disutility from an unequal distribution
of the gains from an interaction. Since Fehr and Schmidts (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels(2000) seminal contributions, it has often been argued that
subject behavior in lab experiments is heavily a¤ected by inequality aversion.
In the following we analyze the consequences of Fehr and Schmidt preferences
for the provision behavior on credence goods markets. More specically, we
assume that the utility of a seller of type (a; b) does not only depend depend
on her own monetary payo¤ ys but also on the payo¤ of the consumer, yc:
Ua;b(ys; yc) = ys   a(maxfyc   ys; 0g)  b(maxfys   yc; 0g): (2)
The assumptions from the literature apply: a  b; i.e. a person su¤ers
more from disadvantageous inequality than from inequality in the persons
favor; and b < 1; i.e. the seller refrains wasting money to reduce advanta-
geous inequality, because the direct e¤ect on ys is stronger than the reduced
disutility due to a more equal outcome. This is the two-person model of Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). Following the observation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999,
2003) we assume that buyers and sellers are heterogeneous with respect to
their inequality aversion, ie. an agents type is characterized by values of a
and b. Types are independently drawn from the same cumulative distribution
G(a; b) with strictly positive density on [0; amax] [bmin; 1) for all a  b and
G(a; b) = 0 for a < b. Given that we are only interested in sellersprovision
behavior, it is only important that a; b are seller specic and do not change
in short periods of time.
Similar to the previous model, we restrict attention to the case where
veriability holds. Given that inequality aversion is stronger or weaker de-
pending on whether inequality is to the sellers advantage or disadvantage,
one rst has to determine where these structural breaks take place. For sim-
plicity of presentation we concentrate in what follows on prices with pl > c
l
2
.
This restriction seems quite natural and it ensures that undertreatment (i.e.
providing tl when th is needed) implies an outcome where the monetary pay-
o¤ of the expert exceeds that of the consumer. To characterize the provision
behavior of an expert with inequality averse preferences it is useful to sub-
divide the space of price vectors in 4 areas depending on the sign of the
di¤erence in monetary payo¤s of the two trading partners in case of appro-
priate treatment. In area A, the experts monetary payo¤ exceeds that of
the customer in both cases, when the customer needs th and appropriately
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receives th and when he needs tl and appropriately receives tl. This area
is dened by v   ph < ph   ch and v   pl < pl   cl. In area B the expert
is better o¤ if she appropriately provides high quality but worse o¤ if she
appropriately provides low quality and low quality is su¢ cient. This area is
dened by v   ph < ph   ch and v   pl > pl   cl. In area C the expert is al-
ways worse o¤ if she provides the appropriate quality. This area is dened by
v  ph > ph  ch and v  pl > pl  cl. And nally in area D where the expert
is worse o¤ if she provides appropriately high quality but better o¤ if she
provides appropriately low quality. This area is dened by v   ph > ph   ch
and v   pl < pl   cl. Figure 4 displays the four areas, beginning with area
A in the upper right quadrant continuing counter clockwise with areas B, C
and D, respectively.
Within each area it is straightforward to solve for the provision behavior
of the expert depending on what the consumer needs (details available from
the authors on request). Figure 4 shows the combinations of prices that
induce an expert to provide the appropriate treatment, to always provide high
quality (overtreatment if the customer needs tl), to always provide low quality
(undertreatment if the customer need th) and to always provide exactly the
wrong quality, i.e. provide th if tl is needed and tl if th is needed. For
our arguments below it is important to note that the provision behavior of
experts with Fehr and Schmidt is qualitatively as depicted in the gure for all
values of a and b: The only exception is that for high values of a the always
wrong treatment region enters area B (implying that the always appropriate
treatment region disappears from area C).3
3.3 Contrasting the TwoModels of Non-Standard Pref-
erences
First note that all three models of experts behavior - the standard model,
the taste for e¢ ciency model, and the inequality aversion model - share a
monotonicity in the predicted behavior: Consider the standard model rst.
Holding ph constant and increasing pl from some point below ph  (ch cl) to
a price above; the expert is predicted to rst overtreat the customer, then,
exactly at pl = ph   (ch   cl), the experts behavior is undetermined (and
3Note that the always wrong region is neceaasrily to the low left of the always ap-
propriate treatment region and that those to region necessarily intersect in exactly one
point.
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ph
ph=(v+ch)/2
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appropriate
treatment
under-
treatment
overtreatment
pl
pl=(v+cl )/2
always wrong
treatment
C D
Figure 4: Price vectors such that the expert provides always the appropriate
treatment, always th (overtreatment), always tl (undertreatment) and always
the wrong treatment (a = 0:5; b = 0:25).
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usually it is assumed she provides the appropriate treatment), and for higher
pl0s (> ph   (ch   cl)) the expert is predicted to undertreat the customer.
A taste for e¢ ciency implies an even stricter monotonicity, the expert rst
overtreats, then she provides the appropriate treatment (as a unique predic-
tion), then she undertreats. Additionally, the measure of the region around
the equal mark-up prices pl = ph (ch cl) where the expert provides the ap-
propriate treatment is positive. Inequality averse preferences are consistent
with two di¤erent behavior patterns, rst moving from over- to appropriate
to undertreatment and second moving from overtreatment to providing al-
ways the wrong treatment to undertreatment. See the gures above for an
illustration.
Prediction 2 Behavior of sellers can be explained by one of the three
models if, holding ph constant and varying pl; leads to one of the follow-
ing three patterns: a change of behavior from overtreatment to appropriate
treatment to undertreatment.
a) overtreatment - appropriate treatment - undertreatment;
b) overtreatment - always wrong treatment - undertreatment;
c) overtreatment - arbitrary treatment (exactly at pl = ph   (ch   cl)) -
undertreatment.
The two alternative models encompass the standard model for  =  =
0 or a = b = 0 respectively. To discriminate, we therefore assume that
all parameters are strictly positive. One di¤erence between the two non-
standard models is, that equal mark-up contracts always induce e¢ cient
provision by subjects with a taste for e¢ cient in the experts role, but that
subjects with inequality averse preferences may refer to overtreatment or
always wrong treatment under equal mark-up prices.
The following prediction identies a price vector that allows to di¤eren-
tiate between the two models.
Prediction 3 Consider an equal-mark-up price vector with ph = (v +
ch)=2 and pl = ph   (ch   cl). Under this price vector
 appropriate treatment is consistent with preferences for e¢ ciency and
standard preferences but inconsistent with inequality averse preferences;
furthermore, if an increase in pl still leads to appropriate treatment then
this behavior can only be explained by a taste for e¢ ciency.
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 overtreatment is consistent with inequality averse preferences and stan-
dard preferences but inconsistent with preferences for e¢ ciency; fur-
thermore, if an increase in pl leads to appropriate provision behavior
then this behavior can only be explained by inequality averse preferences.
 always providing the wrong treatment is consistent with inequality
averse preferences and standard preferences; furthermore, on the one
hand if an increase in pl leaves the behavior unchanged (always pro-
vision of wrong treatment) then it is only consistent with inequality
averse preferences; on the other hand if an increase in pl leads to un-
dertreatment then this behavior is consistent with standard preferences
and inequality averse preferences.
 any other behavior is only consistent with standard preferences; fur-
thermore if an increase in pl leads to undertreatment, the standard
preferences are conrmed.
4 Testing for the Non-Standard Behavior Pre-
dictions
To test the predictions for provision behavior of subjects in the expert role,
we conducted an additional set of experiments using a xed price design with
veriability. The timing of the game is exactly the same as in section 2 except
that the rst stage of the game was replaced by the experimental software
choosing a price vector from the set {(4,8), (5,8), (6,8), (7,8)} with equal
probability. This set of vectors has two characteristics, rst and foremost,
it includes an equal mark-up vector that allows to discriminate between ex-
perts with (potential) preferences for e¢ ciency and experts with (potential)
inequality averse preferences. The sets other prices increase pl which allows
us to check the change in behavior induced by a change in prices consistent
with Prediction 3. Second the set consists of the four most frequently chosen
price vectors in condition V. Given that the prices were xed from the sellers
perspective, we refer to this condition as condition V-Fix.
Similar to the analysis of conditions N and V, we report in the following
observations on aggregate and individual behavior for condition V-Fix.
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4.1 Aggregate Behavior
To concentrate on the provision behavior, we report the under- and overtreat-
ment rate for the four price vectors in Table 5.
Table 5: Under- and overtreatment rates in condition V-Fix
(pl; ph) Frequency Undertreatment rate Overtreatment rate
(4,8) 25% 21.05% 41.38%
(5,8) 25% 68.18% 5.88%
(6,8) 25% 60.61% 2.56%
(7,8) 25% 77.27% 3.85%
Three observations are immediate. First, on the aggregate level there ex-
ists evidence that monetary incentives work in the direction standard theory
predicts, namely that an increase in the payo¤ for undertreating customers,
i.e. an increase in pl, increases the undertreatment rate. Second, there is an
considerable number of subjects providing the appropriate treatment under
each price vector. Third, the overtreatment rate is very high under the equal
mark-up vector (4,8), indicating that inequality avers preferences play an
important role.
In the following, we classify individual consumers into three groups ac-
cording to Prediction 3.
4.2 Individual Behavior
Prediction 3 provided a classication of types of customers. Table 6 applies
this classication to subjects that participated in V-Fix, column 2 uses the
data from all 16 periods while column 3 relies only on the data from periods
7 to 16, i.e. the nal 10 periods. A subject is classied into one of the
groups, if for all rounds under inspection his or her behavior corresponds to
the behavior identied in Prediction 3 for one of the 3 types. As already
mentioned in prediction 3, some individuals can be classied as either type.
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Table 6: Classication of Individual Behavior in V-Fix.4
Behavior consistent with # (all 16 periods) # (last 10 periods)
Standard Preferences 5 6
Taste for E¢ ciency 6 7
Inequality Aversion 4 4
Standard and Taste f. E¤. 4 6
Standard and Inequ. Av. 4 5
Total 23 (of 32) 28 (of 32)
The main observation one can get from inspecting Table 6 is that the
provision behavior of 28 of the 32 subjects is consistent with one of the three
models if one only uses data of the last 10 periods. If all 16 periods are
considered, it is still possible to explain the behavior of 23 of the 32 subjects.
While this is only supercial evidence that the proposed models of non-
standard preferences can explain observed behavior well, it indicates that
the basic principles upon which these models are based, carry substantial
explanatory value.
Similar to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), this result points to the importance of
heterogeneity of subjects in economic experiments. Subjects display consis-
tent behavior over a long period of time (the last ten periods or all periods)
and their behavior allows to classify more than 85% into one of the three
groups. The behavior is clearly driven by di¤erent motives and while study-
ing the aggregate data can give rst evidence and provide ideas for further
elaboration, analyzing the individual behavior is important to understand
the incentives that inuence behavior of subjects on experimental credence
goods markets.
4We classify as: Standard Preferences all subjects that provide eratic behavior or un-
dertreat at (4,8) and undertreat for all other price vectors; Taste for E¢ ciency all subjects
that provide the appropriate treatment at (4,8) and (5,8) and either appropriately treat or
undertreat for theother price vectors; Inequality Aversion all subjects that either overtreat
or provide the appropriate treatment at (4,8) and provide the appropriate treatment for
some other price vector; Standard and Taste for E¢ ciency all subjects that provide ap-
propriate treatment at (4,8) and undertreat for all other price vectors; Standard and
Inequality Aversion all subjects that overtreat or provide always the wrong treatment at
(4,8) and undertreat for any other price vector.
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5 Conclusions
This article started by documenting experts behavior in a credence goods ex-
periment. From this experiment one can learn that while standard economic
theory can explain some ine¢ ciencies that prevail on experimental (and real
life) credence goods markets, it cannot explain why veriability - as one mar-
ket institution that is predicted to solve the credence goods problem - fails to
improve e¢ ciency on experimental markets. Furthermore, standard theory
cannot explain, why a substantial share of subjects in the experts role pro-
vide appropriate treatments even if it is against their own monetary interest
or why experts who are provided with the theoretically optimal monetary
incentives refer to providing high quality where low quality is su¢ cient. Fi-
nally standard theory cannot explain the frequency of price vectors that split
the gains of trade equally between experts and consumers - if experts provide
the appropriate treatment and charge for it. Besides drawing such conclu-
sions from aggregate data based on di¤erent experimental conditions, we also
looked at individual behavior and found indications that some experts have
a taste for e¢ ciency, while other display inequality aversion.
We next analyzed two models of non-standard preferences that allow for
a Taste for E¢ ciency on the one hand and for Inequality Aversion on the
other hand. For both models we derived predictions with respect to experts
provision behavior under certain sets of prices. Combining these prediction
with the predictions under the assumption of standard preferences allowed
us to identify three di¤erent types of subjects, namely those with standard
preferences, those with Inequality Averse preferences and those with a Taste
for E¢ ciency. This classications can explain the behavior of more than 90%
of the subjects who show consistent behavior over the last 10 periods of the
experiment.
Several conclusions result. First and foremost, these experiments show
that some people indeed have preferences that are geared towards e¢ ciency.
This implies, on the one hand, that problems on credence goods markets
are less severe than theory predicts, because some experts do not abuse
their power due to moral costs of ine¢ cient behavior. On the other hand,
it suggests that institutions should be designed such that individuals with
these type of preferences are particularly likely to end up in positions where
credence goods problems play a great role. The medical sector seems to be
the most important sector in question. An avenue for further research is the
use of professionals from the health sector in similar experiments to nd out
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whether these professionals are more or less e¢ ciency loving than the general
population.
Second, while standard preferences can qualitatively predict some of the
e¢ ciency problems, they are not able to take into account problems that may
arise due to prevailing inequality. Such preferences seem to be important
in credence goods situations and our predictions show that new types of
ine¢ ciencies can result, namely overtreatment and the provision of always
the wrong treatment. While in this case our evidence is only preliminary,
another avenue for further research would be to test these theories also in
eld experiments. Schneider (2006) provides a study in this direction using
car mechanics.
Third, as already pointed out by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000), nonstandard preferences always come with heterogeneity.
Thus just investigating aggregate behavior in empirical studies, especially
on the e¤ect of incentive systems, may be misleading as individuals react in
di¤erent ways to the (monetary) incentives provided given their preferences.
As indicated above, in a policy context, this indicates that selecting the right
group of people for a certain profession may be worthwhile. Apart from
this recommendation, it also questions to what extent experimental studies
concentrating only on aggregate data can help to inform policy design.
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